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Comments
Resurrection of Reynolds: 1974
Amendment to National Defense
and Foreign Policy Exemption
INTRODUCTION
The Freedom of Information Act of 19671 was designed to
facilitate public access to government information. However,
any information pertaining to national defense or foreign policy
was exempted from the Act's disclosure requirements. 2 In 1974
Congress amended the entire Act, including exemption (b) (1)3 so
that courts now have the power to require an in camera examina-
tion of a government document and to assay the propriety of the
document's classification in light of both the information it con-
tains and apposite Executive order standards. This is a signifi-
cant departure from Congress' initial enactment but appears to
be in consonace with the caselaw that preceded the Information
Act 4 and with the original intent of Congress.
1. 81 Stat. 54, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970).
2. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (1970).
3. 88 Stat. 1561, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (Supp. 1974).
4. See discussion of United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1(1953). infra. II B.
Prior to passage of the Freedom of Information Act it was
extremely difficult to acquire information from the government.
In fact, before the passage of section 3 of the Administrative
Procedure Act of 1946 it was virtually impossible for an inquirer
to secure information for his own private use unless he was a
litigant suing the government and using the typical discovery
tools. There was no legislative justification for permitting a
non-litigant to rummage through government files.
Dr. Harold Cross has identified three principal obstacles to the
acquisition of information prior to passage of the Information
Act: the series of statutes commonly called the housekeeping
statute; 6 executive privilege (including the state secrets
privilege); and section 3 of the Administrative Procedure Act of
1946.1 These statutory and judicial rationalizations for refusing
to reveal requested information to the public will be briefly
reviewed in order to give the reader an adequate understanding
of some of the bases upon which claims of protecting national
defense or foreign policy were premised. This comment will then
examine the national defense and foreign policy exemptions of
both the 1967 and 1974 Acts, focusing both on the case law and on
legislative history.
II
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT OF 1967
A. The Federal Housekeeping Statute
One of the earliest statutory justifications for the withholding
of desired information was the housekeeping statute,8 a series of
provisions designed to invest executive department heads with
the authority to promulgate "rules and regulations" for the or-
derly control of departmental papers.' From 1789 to 1872 Con-
gress enacted several statutes with this objective in mind. 10 Au-
5. See H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 3 (1966).
6. REV. STAT. § 161 (1875), as amended 5 U.S.C. § 22 (1958). The principle is
now embodied in 5 U.S.C. § 301 (1970). For the text of REV. STAT. § 161 see infra II
A n. 9. For the text of 5 U.S.C. § 301 see infra II A n. 29.
7. Administrative Procedure Act § 3. Ch. 324, § 3, 60 Stat. 238 (1946).
8. REV. STAT. § 161 (1875), as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 22 (1958):
The head of each department is authorized to prescribe regulations, not
inconsistent with law, for the government of his department, the con-
duct of its officers and clerks, the distribution and performance of its
business, and the custody, use, and preservation of the records, papers,
and property appertaining to it. (emphasis added)
9. Note, Reform in the Classification and Declassification of National
Security Information: Nixon Executive Order 11,652, 59 IOWA L. REV. 110, 112
(1973).
10. See 49 TEXAS L. REV. 780,782 n.13 (1971).
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thority was originally given to the Secretary of the Department
of Foreign Affairs.1 Soon thereafter similar grants were made to
the Secretaries of War,12 Treasury, 13 Navy, 14 Interior, 5 Justice, 6
and Post Office.1
7
Pursuant to this authority, the heads of these departments
proceeded to promulgate regulations which would best manage
the departmental papers in the custody of subordinates. More
specifically, the regulations denied subordinates the discretion
to make decisions to release information in their control.' 8
Rather, if subpoenaed by a litigant in a judicial proceeding to
which the government was not a party, the subordinate was
obligated to refer the request and subpoena to the department
head who would then make the final decision.
The Supreme Court recognized the constitutionality of these
statutes and the regulations promulgated thereunder in several
cases.' 9 Courts have also held that, although the government's
refusal to disclose requested information when it was a party-
litigant would subject the government to judicially imposed
sanctions, 20 there was little the courts could do if the government
11. Act of July 27, 1789, ch. 4 § 4, 1 Stat. 28.
The Secretary for the Department of Foreign Affairs. . . shall. . . be
entitled to have the custody and charge of all records, books and papers
in the office of the Secretary for the Department of Foreign Affairs ...
The Department was renamed the Department of State by Act of Sept. 15, 1789,
ch. 14, § 1, 1 Stat. 68.
12. Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 49.
13. Act of Sept. 2, 1789, ch. 12, 1 Stat. 65.
14. Act of April 30, 1798, ch. 35, 1 Stat. 553.
15. Act of Mar. 3, 1849, ch. 108, 9 Stat. 395.
16. Act of June 22, 1870, ch. 150, § 8, 16 Stat. 162.
17. Act of June 8, 1872, ch. 335, 17 Stat. 283.
18. Mitchell, Government Secrecy in Theory and Practice: "Rules and
Regulations" as an Autonomous Screen, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 199 (1958).
19. See Boske v. Comingore, 177 U.S. 459 (1900). (Treasury regulation pro-
hibiting production of records by Internal Revenue valid), and United States ex
rel. Touhy v. Ragen, 340 U.S. 462 (1951) (Attorney General's regulations valid).
See MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 108 n. 16 (1972).
20. The courts have been ingenius in devising constraints designed to induce
the government to reveal evidence that it holds and that the opposing party
desires. Where the government is a plaintiff in a civil case the court can order
dismissal: Mitchell v. Bass, 252 F.2d 513 (8th Cir. 1958). If the government is a
defendant the court can refuse to permit it to introduce certain evidentiary items:
Bank Line, Ltd. v. United States, 76 F. Supp. 801 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). Similarly,
certain facts may be taken as established against the government.
In criminal proceedings the court has often held that if the government refuses
to disclose the requested information it must suffer dismissal: United States v.
was not a party to the litigation in which the subpoena was
issued. Further, both Boske v. Comingore21 and United States ex
rel. Touhy v. Ragen22 made it clear that if the department regula-
tions required the subordinate to forward the subpoena to the
department head and deprived the subordinate of the discretion
to release the information then, in a dispute between private
parties, the subordinate was immune from contempt proceed-
ings.23 Nor could the parties ordinarily acquire the information
from the department head since the trial court rarely had juris-
diction over him.24 Under these circumstances the housekeeping
statute became a major obstacle impeding the discovery of infor-
mation from government sources by private litigants when the
government was not a party.
In an attempt to eliminate executive department reliance on
the housekeeping statute as a government "non-disclosure
law," 25 Congress in 1958 amended it to provide: "This section
does not authorize withholding information from the public or
limiting the availability of records to the public. '26 Although the
eventual effect of the Congressional amendment was debated by
commentators, Congressional intent appeared to be relAtively
clear, 27 and the courts were ready to effectuate it.28 The house-
Andolschek, 142 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1944). See also Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S.
657 (1957) and 84 Stat. 926,18 U.S.C. 3500 (1970) for an additional course of action
available to the courts.
21. 177 U.S. 459 (1900).
22. 340 U.S. 462 (1951). See 47 Nw. U.L. REV. 519 (1952).
23. 177 U.S. at 467, 470; 340 U.S. at 469.
24. 69 YALE L.J. 452, 455 (1960); McCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 180 (1972).
25. Congress felt that the executive agencies were relying too heavily upon
section 22 in refusing to disclose information. See remarks of Rep. Moss in 104
CONG. REC. 6572 (1958).
The reason the language is added that it is not authority for withholding
is that in 3 years of careful study we have found far too many instances
where. . .departments have relied upon this statute as a clear authority
to refuse information to the public or to Congress itself.
26. 72 Stat. 547, 5 U.S.C. § 22 (1958).
27. One commentator stated that a new amendment (of the 1958 amend-
ment) was needed to preserve the rules of Boske and Touhy protecting subordi-
nates. He apparently believed the 1958 amendment had destroyed those rules.
See Carrow, Government Nondisclosure in Judicial Proceedings, 107 U. PA. L.
REV. 166 (1958). A different view was expressed in Mitchell, supra n. 18. He
suggests that the amendment reaffirms Boske and Touhy and merely asserts
that the department head can no longer use section 22 to suppress information. In
light of the legislative history of the amendment the latter view seems most
accurate. See 104 CONG. REC. 15695 (1958) where Senator Johnson states that (in
quoting from Dr. Harold L. Cross) "Those decisions [Boske and Touhy] which, in
my opinion, correctly interpret title 5, United States Code, Section 22, would not
be affected at all by the amendment." See Hearings on Availability of Informa-
tion From Federal Departments and Agencies Before a Subcommittee of the
House Committee on Government Operations, 84th Cong., 1st. Sess., pt. 11 at
2558-59 (1957) where the subcommittees' chief counsel states that the amendment
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keeping statute is thus no longer one of the principal impedi-
ments to the free flow of information.29
B. State Secrets Privilege30
In addition to the housekeeping statute, the government fre-
quently relied upon non-statutory privileges in their effort to
resist disclosing information sought by litigants in proceedings
to which the government may or may not have been a party.
Amongst the privileges asserted by the government in support of
their position against disclosure were the state secrets privilege,
the privilege to refuse to reveal the identities of informants, the
privilege not to disclose official information and executive
privilege.3 1 Of primary concern is the distinction between the
executive privilege and the state secrets privilege.
The privilege of the executive to refuse to disclose information
in his possession is basically a personal right 2 having its con-
would not " ... overrule or change in any way the two major decisions of Boske
and Touhy." See also 69 YALE L.J. 452, 459-461 (1960).
28. See e.g., N.L.R.B. v. Capitol Fish Co., 294 F.2d 868 (5th Cir. 1961); Rosee v.
Board of Trade of the City of Chicago, 35 F.R.D. 512 (N.D. Ill. 1964).
29. When Congress was considering the passage of 5 U.S.C. § 552 (Freedom
of Information Act of 1967) it made reference to the fact the housekeeping statute
was no longer viewed as an impediment to the free flow of information. See H.R.
REP. No. 1497,89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966). It should be noted that 5 U.S.C. § 22 was
amended by 80 Stat. 379, 5 U.S.C. 301 (1970). It reads:
The head of an Executive department or military department may
prescribe regulations for the government of his department, the conduct
of its employees, the distribution and performance of its business, and
the custody, use, and preservation of its records, papers, and property.
This section does not authorize withholding information from the public
or limiting the availability of records to the public.
Additionally, the amendment to section 22 in 1958 was not viewed as giving the
public or press-when uninvolved in litigation-a right to request information
from the government for their own edification. See 69 YALE L.J. 452, 457 n. 34
(1960).
30. Both this and the prior section deal with ground for non-disclosure to
litigants in judicial proceedings either where the suit is between private litigants
inter se or between a private party and the government.
31. The development of the state secrets privilege, and particularly the
notations as to some of the various government privileges is succinctly presented
in Zagel, The State Secrets Privilege, 50 MINN. L. REV. 875 (1966).
32. Id. at 876. See generally Bishop, The Executives Right of Privacy: An
Unresolved Constitutional Question, 66 YALE L.J. 477 (1957); Hardin, Executive
Privilege in the Federal Courts, 71 YALE L.J. 879 (1962); Taubeneck and Sexton,
Executive Privilege and the Courts Right to Know-Discovery Against the
United States in Civil Actions in Federal District Courts, 48 GEO. L.J. 486 (1960);
Younger, Congressional Investigations and Executive Secrecy: A Study in the
Separation of Powers, 20 U. PITT. L. REV. 755 (1959).
stitutional roots in the doctrine of separation of powers.3 3 The
state secrets privilege, on the other hand, is not premised upon the
position of the person asserting it but rather upon the nature3 4 of
the material sought to be protected.35 While the executive may
33. This doctrine was defined by the Hon. William H. Rehnquist as:
[T]he constitutional authority of the President to withhold documents or
information in his possession or in the possession of the executive
branch from compulsory process of the legislative or judicial branch of
the Government. This doctrine is implicit in the separation of powers
established by the Constitution.
Hearings on U.S. Government Information Policies and Practices-The Penta-
gon Papers Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government
Operations, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 1, at 359 n. 4 (1971). The doctrine of executive
privilege has its historical antecedents in the English doctrine that the King can
do no wrong. See Street, State Secrets-A Comparative Study, 14 MOD. L. REV.
121 (1951). The incident that broached the question of the extension of the
privilege to Presidents was the failure of the 1792 St. Clair expedition into the
Northwest Territory. See T. TAYLOR, GRAND INQUEST 17 (1955). The House sought
information from President Washington but he noted, in surrendering the re-
quested information, that the executive has the discretion to withhold certain
information that may injure the public. In 1796 both the House and the Senate
sought information concerning instructions given the negotiator of the Jay
Treaty which was designed to assure British withdrawal from western out-
posts following the Revolutionary War; Washington, asserting privilege, refused
to turn over the information to the Senate but did disclose it to the House. See
Younger, supra n. 32 at 757-58. See generally Berger, Executive Privilege v.
Congressional Inquiry (pts. 1-2) 12 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1044 at 1093,1094,1096 (1965).
34. The information sought to be protected under this privilege can be
characterized as either diplomatic or military. More specific parameters will be
considered within the discretion of Executive Order 11652.
35. Zagel, supra n. 31 at 892. Not all commentators are in accord on the
questionof the separate identities of these privileges. See generally Note, Reform
In the Classification and Declassification of National Security Information:
Nixon Executive Order 11652, 59 IOWA L. REV. 110,113 (1973) where the commen-
tator states:
In a number of cases the courts have held, even in the absence of
statutory authority, that the government is privileged to withhold confi-
dential information bearing on the national defense or foreign relations.
Although this privilege supposedly grew out of the common law, the
ultimate power of the Executive to refuse disclosure of government
documents, where no statute bears on the subject, rests on presidential
authority.
This author and the author of Note, Reform (id.) view the generic privilege as an
"executive" one; and the state secrets privilege and the confidential communica-
tions privilege are subsumed under this broad title. For additional commentators
accepting somewhat similar views see 25 VAND. L. REV. 397, 398-99 (1972); 83
HARV. L. REV. 928, 931 (1970); 42 U. CINN. L. REV. 529,537 (1973) where the
commentator in referring to United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953), states
that
In this executive privilege case the Court held that where the Govern-
ment asserts executive privilege to withhold secret information, it need
not produce the material for in camera inspection if it can show from all
circumstances that there is a danger that disclosure would jeopardize
national security.
It's arguable that the author of the comment views the state secrets privilege as an
aspect of executive privilege rather than as a distinct privilege founded upon a
disparate basis.
For additional information on the state secrets privilege see generally Sanford,
Evidentiary Privileges Against the Production of Data Within Control of the
[VOL. 4: 81, 1976] Resurrection of Reynolds
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arguably36 claim the exclusive power to decide whether or not to
release information in his possession, his power has been viewed
by some commentators as circumscribed in the area of state
secrets. 37 This view is said to proceed from the realization that the
two privileges derive from separate sources. One commentator
speaking of the privileges has suggested that
The state secrets privilege was judicially created, and it is foolish to
assert that the judiciary is without power to supervise its exercise.
Problems of executive versus judicial power do arise over executive
privilege. . . . The executive privilege is founded on the separation of
powers. The executive asserts its freedom to decide which materials it
shall disclose and to whom it shall disclose them. This privilege is not
based on the nature of ths material withheld. . . but upon the execu-
tive's personal right to determine when withholding is in the public
interest. The state secrets privilege may be distinguished in that it is
defined solely by reference to the privileged material.3 8 [emphasis
added.]
Nor have the courts entirely rejected the view that they can
supervise the exercise of the state secrets privilege.
39
Although the state secrets privilege was conceived in the early
years of the Republic 40 it has fully matured and is widely ac-
Executive Departments, 3 VAND. L. REV. 73 (1949); Berger and Krash, Govern-
ment Immunity from Discovery, 59 YALE L.J. 1451 (1949-50); Carrow, Govern-
ment Nondisclosure in Judicial Proceedings, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 166 (1958);
Gromley, Discovery Against the Government of Military and Other Confiden-
tial Matters, 43 Ky. L.J. 343 (1954).
36. But cf. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), where it was con-
tended that the President, under the privilege of the confidentiality of communi-
cations (an aspect of executive privilege) could refuse to disclose subpoenaed
documents in a criminal case. The court, however, did not accept this
proposition.
37. Zagel supra n.31 at 892 where it is stated that "It would seem that the
executive could not properly claim the exclusive legal power to decide questions
of the state secrets privilege." It should be noted that, while some commentators
have viewed the state secrets privilege as part of executive privilege, even the
Supreme Court in United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), took great care to
distinguish the two. This seems to affirm the suggestions of Mr. Zagel.
38. Zagel supra n.31 at 892.
39. See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
40. See, e.g., 1 ROBERTSON, THE REPORTS OF THE TRIALS OF COLONEL AARON
BURR (1969). In the Aaron Burr trial Chief Justice John Marshall issued a
subpoena duces tecum to President Jefferson calling upon him to produce cer-
tain communications with General Wilkinson. The government contended that
these communications contained information involving Spain and France. Jus-
tice Marshall said, at 186-87, "There is certainly nothing before the court which
shows that the letter in question contains any matter the disclosure of which
would endanger public safety. . . ."Even at this early date the court was moving
with circumspection if a matter might threaten the continued existence of the
nation or result in a costly embarrassment to allies.
knowledged today.4 The courts have recognized its application
to criminal cases prosecuted by the government 42 and also to civil
cases in which the government initiated the action.43 Greatest use
of the privilege is in cases where the government is the defendant
or an intervenor on the side of the defendant. Thus, the privilege
was applied where the government was sued on a secret contract
made personally with the President; 44 where the government
intervened to assert the privilege in a suit against a private party
who possessed the secret information the plaintiff sought to
discover;45 and in a suit against a private party where the govern-
ment intervened to have the secret information expunged from
the record when the plaintiff placed it into evidence.46
Though these cases were important in that they affirmed the
existence of the privilege, United States v. Reynolds47 supplied
the appropriate test to be used in state secrets cases. In
Reynolds48 the court had to decide whether to compel disclosure
of certain Air Force accident reports sought by the widows of
three civilian observers killed during a test flight of a B-29 on a
highly secret mission. The government had asserted the state
secrets privilege.
41. See e.g., Duncan v. Cammell, Laird & Co. (1942) A.C. 624. Citation is to an
English case fully recognizing the privilege in that country. See generally Street,
State Secrets-A Comparative Study, 14 MOD. L. REV. 121 (1951).
42. See e.g., United States v. Haugen, 58 F. Supp. 436 (E.D. Wash. 1944). The
usual rule in criminal cases involving privileges other than the state secrets
privilege is that the government cannot both avail itself of the privilege and
simultaneously proceed with the prosecution. Compare Rovario v. United States,
353 U.S. 53 (1957); United States v. Grayson, 166 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1948); Palermo v.
United States, 360 U.S. 343 (1959); United States v. Andolschek, 142 F.2d 503 (2d
Cir. 1944).
43. See Republic of China v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 142 F. Supp. 551
(D. Md. 1956). In this case the United States and Nationalist China were suing to
recover insurance proceeds for seven ships abandoned by defecting crews. The
documents sought were diplomatic conversations with Great Britian. The court
acknowledged the privilege and prohibited disclosure. It should be noted this is
one of the few cases in which the state secrets privilege has been applied to
information in the form of diplomatic minutae.
44. Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1875). President Lincoln had emp-
loyed the plaintiff to engage in covert intelligence gathering in the Confederate
States during the Civil War. Later, the government refused to forward the
plaintiff his payment. See 25 VAND. L. REV. 397, 398 (1972); Zagel, supra n.31 at
899.
45. Pollen v. Ford Instrument Co., 26 F. Supp. 583 (E.D.N.Y. 1939) (patent
infringement suit).
46. Firth Sterling Steel Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 199 F. 353 (E.D. Pa. 1912)
(another patent infringement suit related to armor piercing projectiles). Com-
pare Cresmer v. United States, 9 F.R.D. 203 (E.D.N.Y. 1949); Chicago & Southern
Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948).
47. 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
48. See 21 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 792 (1952); 16 GA. B.J. 357 (1952); 28 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 1188 (1953); 47 Nw. U.L. REV. 259 (1952); 30 TEXAS L. REV. 889 (1952); 29 WASH.
L. REV. 59 (1952).
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The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Vinson, ac-
knowledged the existence of the privilege 49 but asserted that "the
court itself must determine whether the circumstances are ap-
propriate for the claim of privilege .... ,,50 The Court also dis-
cussed the test to be applied in determining whether the matter
was in fact privileged:
Judicial control over the evidence in a case cannot be abdicated to the
caprice of executive officers. Yet we will not go so far as to say that the
court may automatically require a complete disclosure to the judge
before the claim of privilege will be accepted in any case. It may be
possible to satisfy the court, from all the circumstances of the case, that
there is reasonable danger that the compulsion of the evidence will
expose military matters which, in the interest of national security,
should not be divulged. When this is the case, the occasion for the
privilege is appropriate, and the court should not jeopardize the secu-
rity which the privilege is meant to protect by insisting upon an exami-
nation of the evidence, even by the judge alone, in chambers. 52
It appears plain that the Court recognized the common law
origins of the privilege and the need to retain control over its use.
The Court also asserted that it will vary the depths of its "probes"
into the evidence (to ascertain the validity of the claim) according
to the degree of necessity the inquirer can show for requesting
the information: it will not necessitate disclosure when to do so
would seriously jeopardize national security. 3
C. Section 3 of the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946
The final impediment to the discovery of information (related
in some way to diplomatic or military matters) prior to passage of
the Freedom of Information ActM was section 3 of the Adminis-
49. 345 U.S. 1 at 7.
When the Secretary . . . lodged his formal 'Claim of Privilege,' he
attempted therein to invoke the privilege aginst revealing military se-
crets, a privilege which is well established in the law of evidence.
50. Id. at 8.
51. Id. at 7.
The privilege belongs to the government and must be asserted by it; it
can neither be claimed nor waived by a private party .... There must
be a formal claim of privilege, lodged by the head of department which
has control over the matter, after actual personal consideration ....
52. Id. at 10. It should be noted that some commentators have viewed
Reynolds as an unsuccessful attempt to find a middle ground between complete
disclosure and complete acceptance of the executive assertion. The latter is the
English view stated in Duncan v. Cammell, Laird & Co. (1942) A.C. 624. See Zagel,
supra n.31 at 891.
53. 345 U.S. 1 at 11.
54. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970).
trative Procedure Act of 1946.55 Although Congress labored to
ensure that this act would promote rather than restrict public
access to government information,5 6 substantive ambiguities
presaged a different result.57 The act included two broad, am-
biguous exceptions which barred access to information regard-
ing "any function of the United States requiring secrecy in the
public interest" and information "required for good cause to be
held confidential."5 8
These exceptions to the requirement of disclosure under the
Administrative Procedure Act were included to protect certain
military or diplomatic materials, a goal not seriously ques-
tioned.5 9 But the ambiguities in these exceptions led to innumer-
55. Administrative Procedure Act § 3, ch. 324, § 3,60 Stat. 238 (1946).
Except to the extent that there is involved (1) any function of the United
States requiring secrecy in the public interest or (2) any matter related
solely to the internal management of an agency-
(a) RULES-Every agency shall seperately state and currently pub-
lish in the Federal Register (1) descriptions of its central and field
organizations . . . (2) statements of general course and method
by which its functions are channeled and determined . . . (3)
substantive rules ... and statements of general policy. . . , but
not rules addressed to and served upon named persons in ac-
cordance with law ....(b) OPINIONS AND ORDERS-Every agency shall publish or, in
accordance with published rule, make available to public in-
spection all final opinions or orders in the adjudication of cases
(except those required for good cause to be held confidential and
not cited as precedents) and all rules.
(c) PUBLIC RECORDS-Save as otherwise required by statute,
matters of official records shall in accordance with published
rule be made available to persons properly and directly con-
cerned .... [emphasis added]
56. An examination of H.R. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 198 (1945)
evinces that the central purpose of the Act was the promotion of disclosure. There
it is stated:
The section has been drawn upon the theory that administrative opera-
tions and procedure are public property which the general public. . . is
entitled to know or have ready means of knowing with definiteness and
assurance.
57. This section of the Administrative Procedure Act and the previously
noted two items-housekeeping statute and state secrets privilege-were the
principal tools of those desiring to conceal, rather than reveal, government
information. See 83 HARV. L. REV. 928, 929 (1970); 25 VAND. L. REV. 397,399 (1972);
42 U. CINN. L. REV. 529,530 (1973). See also Moss, Public Information Policies, the
APA, and Executive Privilege, 15 AD. L. REV. 111 (1966).
58. It wap noted in section II B of this comment that the state secrets privilege
was designed to protect military and diplomatic information in a litigant setting,
i.e. where two private parties were involved in a judicial dispute and one sought
government information, or where a private party was suing the government on a
collateral matter and sought to discover government information to assist his
case. With the passage of section 3 of the APA, non litigants could seek informa-
tion for their own edification if they met the other statutory requirements.
Apparently the exception for information "requiring secrecy in the public inter-
est" was designed to establish an exemption similar to the state secrets privilege
in these non non litigant cases.
59. See Moss, supra n.57 at 114 where he states that "We could not quarrel
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PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
able abuses.6" Some of the more noteworthy items excepted
under section 3 include a telephone directory published by the
Navy Ordinance Laboratory,61 contractor bids submitted con-
cerning the Mohole project,62 fig import statistics, 63 and a guest
list compiled by the Secretary of the Navy for a pleasure trip on a
Navy yacht.64 These abuses prompted the Senate to report that:
Section 3 of the A.P.A. . . . is full of loopholes which allow agencies to
deny legitimate information to the public. Innumerable times it ap-
pears that information is withheld only to cover up embarrasing mis-
takes or irregularities and the withholding is justified by such phrases
in section 3 of the A.P.A. as-"requiring secrecy in the public interest
',65
Thus, while Congress attempted to strike a workable balance
between the promotion of greater public accessability to govern-
ment information (even in non-litigant cases) and the protection
of essentially secret matters, the ambiguities produced by that
effort provided new ammunition for those governmental agen-
cies reluctant to reveal potentially embarrassing or controversial
matters.66 In an effort to remedy the undesirable consequences
with the protection of defense information properly classified under executive
order or statute."
60. See generally S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965); H.R. REP. No.
1497, 89th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1966); 112 CONG. REc. 12976 (1966); Hearings on S.
1160, S. 1336, S. 1758 and S. 1879 Before the Subcommittee on Administrative
Practice and Procedure of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1965); Hearings on S. 1663, Administrative Procedure Act, Before the Subcom-
mittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964); Hearings on Government Information,
Plans and Policies, Before the Subcommittee of the House Committee on Gov-
ernment Operations, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963). See also Engel, Introduction:
Information Disclosure Policies and Practices of Federal Administrative Agen-
cies, 68 Nw. U.L. REV. 184, 188 (1973).
61. Moss, supra n.57 at 113.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 115.
64. Note, Comments on Proposed Amendments to Section 3 of the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act: The Freedom of Information Bill. 40 NOTRE DAME LAW.
417, 436 (1964-65).
65. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT SOURCE BOOK: LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS,
CASES, ARTICLES, SUBCOMMITTEE OF ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF
THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE, 93rd Cong., 2nd
Sess. (Comm. Print 1974) [hereinafter cited as SOURCE BOOK].
66. See S. REP. No. 1219, 88th Cong., 2nd Sess. 10 (1964) where its noted that:
The present section 3 of the Administrative Procedure Act is of little or
no value to the public in gaining access to records of the Federal
Government. Precisely the opposite has been true: it is cited as statutory
authority for the withholding of virtually any piece of information that
an official or an agency does not wish to disclose.
of section 3, Congress, as early as 1955, examined several legisla-
tive proposals designed to accomplish this result.67 Initially, the
Congress was reluctant to consider the suggestions. However, by
1966 the Eighty-ninth Congress finally approved an amendment
to section 3.68 The amendment was to be known as the Freedom
of Information Act and was a major step in the direction of
public disclosure.
III
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT OF 1967: EXEMPTION B(1)
A. Introduction
The Freedom of Information Act 69 was designed to increase
the availability of government documents to the public in gener-
al.70 In addition to requiring agency publication of certain
specified information in the Federal Register,71 it also called
upon agencies to permit public inspection and copying of certain
enumerated materials.72 The heart of the Act is subsection (a) (3)3
Of interest here is the suggestion that section 3 was cited as statutory authority to
withhold. A similar use was made of the "housekeeping" statute.
67. See generally S. 2504,84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955); S. 2541, 84th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1955); S. 2148, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957); S. 4094, 85th Cong., 2nd Sess.
(1958); S. 186, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959); S. 1070, 86th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1960) (a
revised version of S. 186, supra.); S. 1887, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961); H.R. 9926,
87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961); S. 1567,87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961); S. 1907,87th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1961); and S. 3410, 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1962). None of these bills
received the undivided attention of the Congress until 1963. On June 4, 1963 two
bills were introduced in the Senate. S. 1663, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963) was
introduced by Senators Dirkson and Long and was designed to amend the entire
APA. S. 1666, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963) was identical to section 3 of S. 1663 and
aimed only at amending section 3 of the APA. See also Hearings Before the
Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure of Senate Committee
on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
68. After the 1963 Hearings several revisions were made in S. 1666. It was
re-examined and once again revised in July 1964. See Hearings Before the
Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Com-
mittee on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1964). This amended version
passed the Senate on July 31, 1964 but no action was taken on it prior to the
adjournment of the House.
A modified version of S. 1666 was introduced in both houses of Congress. S.
l160's companion bill in the House was H.R. 5012, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965). S.
1160 passed the Senate during the 89th Cong. (Oct. 13, 1965) and also passed the
House (June 20, 1966).
69. 81 Stat. 54, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970).
70. Id. § 552(a)(3).
71. Id. § 552(a)(1).
72. Id. § 552(a)(2).
73. Id. § 552(a)(3) where it is stated:
Except with respect to the records made available under paragraphs (1)
and (2) of this subsection, each agency, on request for identifiable
records made in accordance with published rules stating the time, place,
fees to the extent authorized by statute, and procedure to be followed,
shall make the records promptly available to any person. On complaint,
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which states that "any person," litigant or non-litigant, can make
a "request" for identifiable records in accordance with the req-
uisite rules and procedures. Disclosure, however, is subject to the
exemptions of subjection (b).74 If the agency refuses the request
the inquirer may sue in either the United States District Court
where the "complainant resides" or has his "principal place of
business," or where the "agency records are situated." The Dis-
trict Court can make a de novo determination of the validity of
the refusal and is empowered to "order the production" of the
records and impose contempt sanctions if the responsible em-
ployee fails to comply with the court order.7 5
Despite the general rule of disclosure which is premised on the
belief that "an informed electorate is vital to the proper opera-
tion of a democracy,"7 6 the Act also lists nine types of materials to
which its disclosure provisions do not apply.77 The specific iden-
the district court of the United States in the district in which the comp-
lainant resides, or has his principal place of business, or in which the
agency records are situated, has jurisdiction to enjoin the agency from
withholding agency records and to order the production of any agency
records improperly withheld from the complaintant. In such a case the
court shall determine the matter de novo and the burden is on the agency
to sustain'its action. In the event of noncompliance with the order of the
court, the district court may punish for contempt the responsible em-
ployee, and in the case of a uninformed service, the responsible member.
74. Id. § 552(b)(1-9).
75. See H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89 Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1966) where it was noted that
"Improper denials occur again and again .... The Administrative Procedure
Act provides no adequate remedy to members of the public to force disclosure in
such cases." Undoubtedly the Congress provided de novo review to assure
frustrated applicants that similar abuses would not be perpetuated under the
F.O.I.A.
76. S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965).
77. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) states:
This section does not apply to matters that are-
(1) specifically required by Executive order to be kept secret in the
interest of the national defense or foreign policy;(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an
agency;
(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute;
(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained
from a person and privileged or confidential;
(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which
would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in
litigation with the agency;
(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of
which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of per-
sonal privacy;
(7) investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes ex-
cept to the extent available by law to a party other than an
agency;
tification of exempted materials was intended to eliminate the
broad semantic ambiguities that fostered the abuses under Sec-
tion 3 of the A.P.A. 78 When these exemptions are construed in
harmony with the other provisions of the Act it becomes appar-
ent that Congress was hoping to facilitate an improvement in the
free flow of information by making basic changes in the A.P.A.79
Although nine exemptions are enumerated in the Act, this com-
ment is concerned solely with the exemption designed to protect
national defense and foreign policy.80
B. The National Defense and Foreign Policy Exemption
Subsection (b)(1) of the Freedom of Information Act of 1967
states:
This section does not apply to matters that are-(1) specifically re-
quired by Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of the
national defense or foreign policy.
It has been contended that the phrase "specifically required by
Executive order" does not incorporate81 Executive Order 10501,82
(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition
reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency
responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institu-
tions; or
(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including
maps, concerning wells.
78. See generally II c. supra n.60.
79. See H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1966) where the House
notes the general areas of change the F.O.I.A. would make in section 3 of the
A.P.A.
(1) It eliminates the "properly and directly concerned" test of who shall
have access to public records, stating that the great majority of
records shall be available to "any person" ....(2) It sets up workable standards for the categories of records which
maybe exempt from public disclosure, replacing the vague phrases,
"good cause found," "in the public interest," and "internal manage-
ment" with specific definitions of information which may be with-
held ....
(3) It gives an aggrieved citizen a remedy by permitting an appeal to a
U.S. district court.
80. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1).
81. See Justice Brennan's dissent in Environmental Protection Agency v.
Mink, 410 U.S. 73 at 96-100 (1972) where he states that the Act was not intended to
incorporate Exec. Order No. 10,501. He reaches this conclusion by reasoning that
Exec. Order No. 10,501 allows unclassified components of a classified file to
receive the classification of the whole file whereas subsection (b)(1) only exempts
documents "specifically required" to be kept secret.
This view was similarly accepted by the Court of Appeals in Mink v. E.P.A., 464
F.2d 742 (D.C. Cir. 1972). The Court held, at 746, that if "the nonsecret component
are separate from the secret remainder and may be read separately without
distortion of meaning, they too should be disclosed." The court's finding implicit-
ly means that Exec. Order No. 10,501 is not incorporated into subsection (b)(1).
Some support for this position can be found in the legislative history. For
example, S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1965) notes that
Exemption No. I is for matters specifically required by Executive order
to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy. The
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the standing classification order at the time of the passage of the
FOIA. Although some commentators have suggested that such a
result is "socially desirable ' 83 in limited situations, the accepted
view of the authoritative cases is to the contrary.
8 4
Executive Order 10501, characterized as "the model for the
present system of document classification, '85 is the product of an
ontogenetic process that began at least as early as the First World
War.88 This order, which became effective December 15, 1953,
change of standard from "in the public interest" speaking of sec. 3
A.P.A. is made both to delimit more narrowly the exception and to give it
a more precise definition.
This excerpt indicates that the Senate viewed the exemption as an
effort to clarify "in the public interest" of section 3 of A.P.A., rather than
as a definitive effort to incorporate Exec. Order No. 10,501. See 25 VAND.
L. REV. 397, 400, 402 (1972).
82. Exec. Order No. 10,501, 3 C.F.R. 1949-53 Comp. 979 (1958).
83. See 25 VAND. L. REV. 397 at 402 (1972) where the commentator addressing
the Court of Appeals decision in Mink notes that the judgment of the court in
viewing Exec. Order No. 10,501 as not incorporated into subsection (b)(1) and
holding that unclassified attached documents are not exempt from disclosure is
"... socially desirable because it encourages a policy of full public disclosure
that serves to check possible administrative abuses of power."
84. See the majority opinion in Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink,
410 U.S. 73 (1973). This is noted in 42 U. CINN. L. REV. 529 (1973). At 531 the
commentator speaks of Justice White's majority opinion:
He reasoned that the exemption was written to dispel uncertainty, and
that the Congress intended it to be the sole responsibility of the Presi-
dent to determine what material is kept secret. As a result, so long as
material falls within the purview of the Executive order [E.O. 10,501], no
judicial review is authorized. Justice White concluded by saying that
Congress could have provided its own classification procedures, or
ordered the Executive to create new ones, but it did neither.
The view that Exec. Order No. 10,501 reflects what Congress meant when it
exempted documents "specifically required by Executive order to be kept secret"
also receives some support from H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10
(1966), where it's stated:
The language both limits the present vague phrase, "in the public
interest," and gives the area of necessary secrecy a more precise defini-
tion .... Citizens both in and out of Government can agree to restric-
tions on categories of information which the President has determined
must be kept secret to protect the national defense or to advance foreign
policy, such as matters classified pursuant to Executive Order 10,501.
[emphasis added]
See 83 HARV. L. REV. 928,932 (1970). The H. REP. No. 1497,89th Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10
(1966), seems to have been the view the majority accepted in Mink. See 25 VAND.
L. REV. 397,402 (1972). See also DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MEMORAN-
DUM ON THE PUBLIC INFORMATION SECTION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT
30 (1967).
85. Comment, Secrecy in the Conduct of United States Foreign Relations:
Recent Policy and Practice, 6 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 187, 193 (1973).
86. For a masterful examination of the history of document classification
see FOREIGN AFFAIRS DIVISION, LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE SERVICE, LIBRARY OF
limited classifiable information to Top Secret, Secret and Confi-
dential categories,87 held to a reduced minimum the number of
CONGRESS, 92nd Cong., Ist Sess., SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AS A PROBLEM IN THE
CONGRESSIONAL ROLE IN FOREIGN POLICY (Comm. Print 1970).
On March 22,1940 President Roosevelt issued Exec. Order No. 8,381,5 Fed. Reg.
1147 (1940), which was designed to define and recognize the military classification
system. This order was superceded by Exec. Order No. 10,104, 15 Fed. Reg. 597
(1950), issued by President Truman on February 1, 1950. This Order introduced
the "top secret" classification and granted delegable classification authority to
Secretaries of Defense, Army, Navy and Air Force. On September 24, 1951
President Truman issued Exec. Order No. 10,290; 16 Fed. Reg. 9795 (1951). This
order retained the four tier classification system developed following the Second
World War. The levels were "Top Secret" (disclosure would or could cause
"exceptionally grave danger to national security"); "Secret ("information requir-
ing extraordinary protection"); Confidential: requiring only "careful protec-
tion" and "Restricted" (requiring protection against "unauthorized used or dis-
closure") The order also extended the delegation of authority to classify. See
Exec. Order No. 10,290 § 24, C.F.R. 1944-53 Comp. 789(1958), where it's stated that
The ultimate responsibility for the safeguarding of classified security
information within an agency shall remain with and rest upon the head
of the agency, but the head of an agency may delegate the performance
of any or all of the functions charged to him herein including. . .(c)
Authorization of appropriate officials within his agency to assign infor-
mation to the proper classification under these regulations.
In addition to the four level classification system and extended classification
authority, Exec. Order No. 10,290 also provided a somewhat ineffective system
for declassification and downgrading of classifications. Exec. Order No. 10,290,
sec. 28(aa-c).
There was no automatic procedure for declassifying after a stated number of
years but there was an optional automatic and a nonautomatic procedure.
Under the former procedure an official would place a notation on a document
identifying the date or the event that would permit downgrading or declassifica-
tion. The nonautomatic procedure (the one used most prevalently) the classifica-
tion was downgraded or removed upon the occurrence of warranting circum-
stances. Review was provided to determine when those circumstances arose.
87. Exec. Order No. 10,501 § 1(a-c), 3 C.F.R. 1949-53 Comp. 979 (1958).
(a) Top Secret. Except as may be expressly provided by statute, the use
of the classification Top Secret shall be authorized, by appropriate
authority, only for defense information or material which requires the
highest degree of protection. The Top Secret classification shall be
applied only to that information or material the defense aspect of which
is paramount and the unauthorized disclosure of which could result in
exceptionally grave damage to the Nation such as leading to a definite
break in diplomatic relations affecting the defense of the United States,
an armed attack against the United States or its allies, a war, or the
compromise of military or defense plans, or intelligence operations, or
scientific or technological developments vital to the national defense.
(b) Secret. Except as may be expressly provided by statute, the use of
the classification Secret shall be authorized, by appropriate authority,
only for defense information or material the unauthorized disclosure of
which could result in serious damage to the Nation, such as by jeopar-
dizing the international relations of the United States, endangering the
effectiveness of a program or policy of vital importance to the national
defense, or compromising important military or defense plans, scien-
tific or technological developments important to national defense, or
information revealing important intelligence operations.
(c) Confidential. Except as may be expressly provided by statute, the
use of the classification Confidential shall be authorized, by approp-
riate authority, only for defense information or material the unau-
thorized disclosure of which could be prejudicial to the defense interest
of the nation. [emphasis added]
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departments and agencies with power to classify, 88 and created
procedures for automatic declassification and downgrading,89 a
novel proposal in the history of document classification. 90 Execu-
tive Order 10501 was subsequently superseded by Executive
Order 11652,91 but the substantive nucleus of the order remained
extant.
Order 11652, the so-called Nixon Executive order, was designed
to improve the protection of national security information while
advancing public access to government information by ac-
celerating declassification.92 Like 10501, it also functioned on a
tripartite classification schedule.93 But unlike its precursor,
See generally Parks, Secrecy and the Public Interest in Military Affairs, 26
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 23 (1957).
88. Exec. Order No. 10,501 § 2, 3 C.F.R. 1949-53 Comp. 979 (1958). See
generally Note, Reform In the Classification and Declassification of National
Security Information: Nixon Executive Order 11,652, 59 IOWA L. REV. 110, 117
(1973). Thirty-four executive bodies had power to classify documents "Top Sec-
ret" and twelve had a limited power to do so.
89. Exec. Order No. 10,501 § 4,3 C.F.R. 1949-53 Comp. 979 (1958). Section 4 (a)
notes that automatic declassification was to be used to the "fullest extent practic-
able" despite the fact it was not made mandatory.
90. In 1961 President Kennedy issued Exec. Order No. 10,964 which created a
fourth category for information not otherwise within the other three classifica-
tion categories. Automatic declassification over a twelve year period (at three
year intervals) was provided for this fourth group of classified information.
91. Exec. Order No. 11,652,3 C.F.R. 339,37 Fed. Reg. 5209 (1972), as amended
by Exec. Order No. 11,714, 38 Fed. Reg. 10245 (1973). It should be noted that Exec.
Order No. 11,652 did not itself directly amend order 10,501. Rather the amend-
ment of Order 10,501 was a process consisting of several preliminary amend-
ments: Exec. Order No. 10,816,3 C.F.R 1959-63 Comp. 351(1964); Exec. Order No.
10,901,3 C.F.R. 1959-63 Comp. 432 (1964); Exec. Order No. 10,964,3 C.F.R. 1959-63
Comp. 486 (1964); Exec. Order No. 10,985,3 C.F.R. 1959-63 Comp. 518(1964); Exec.
Order No. 11,097, 3 C.F.R. 1959-63 Comp. 750 (1964); Exec. Order No. 11,382, 32
Fed. Reg. 16247 (1967).
92. 8 WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 543 (1972).
93. Exec. Order No. 11,652 § 1, 3 C.F.R. 339, (1972) states:
(A) "Top Secret". "Top Secret" refers to that national security infor-
mation or material which requires the highest degree of protec-
tion. The test for assigning "Top Secret classification shall be
whether its unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected
to cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security.
Examples ... include armed hostilities against the United States
or its allies; disruption of foreign relations vitally affecting the
national security; the compromise of vital national defense plans
or complex cryptologic and communications intelligence sys-
tems .... This classification shall be used with the utmost
restraint.(B) "Secret". "Secret" refers to that national security information or
material which requires a substantial degree of protection. The
test for assigning "Secret" classification shall be whether its unau-
which affected "defense information, '94 11652 applied to nation-
al security information. ' 95 Although this difference has been
viewed as a possible expansion of classifiable information,9 6
other commentators feel that such an understanding is not whol-
ly warranted.97 The tests of 10501 and of 11652 for determining
whether classifiable information is Top Secret, Secret or Confi-
dential are virtually equivalent.98 But 11652 has dramatically
continued the process begun by 10501 of reducing the number of
agencies with classification authority.99 Further, 11652 also es-
tablished a declassification and downgrading schedule'00
thorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause serious
damage to the national security ....
(C) "Confidential". "Confidential" refers to that national security in-
formation or material which requires protection. The test for
assigning "Confidential" classification shall be whether its unau-
thorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause damage
to the national security. [emphasis added]
94. See the Top Secret, Secret and Confidential definitions of Exec. Order
No. 10,501 supra n. 87.
95. See the Top Secret, Secret and Confidential definitions of Exec. Order
No. 11,652 supra n. 93.
96. See Hearings on U.S. Government Information Policies and Practices-
Security Classification Problems Involving Subsection (b)(1) of the Freedom of
Information Act (pt. 7) Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on
Government Operations, 92nd Cong. 2nd. Sess., 2850-53 (1972) [hereinafter cited
as MOORHEAD HEARINGS].
97. Note, Reform in the Classification and Declassification of National
Security Information: Nixon Executive Order 11652, 59 IOWA L. REV. 110, 120
(1973).
98. Under 10,501 and 11,652 the test for "Top Secret" is "exceptionally
grave" and for Secret the test is "serious damage" For "Confidential" there is a
divergence, Exec. Order No. 10,501 had a "prejudicial" test and Exec. Order No.
11,652 has a mere "damage" test.
99. Exec. Order No. 11,652, § 2 (A), 3 C.F.R. 339 (1972). Reduced to twelve the
number of executive departments and independent agencies with authority to
fully classify. Added to this list are 11 offices within the Executive Office of the
President that have been designated in writing as also having full classification
powers.
100. Id. § 5.
Declassification and Downgrading. Classified information and mate-
rial, unless declassified earlier by the original classifying authority,
shall be declassified and downgraded in accordance with the following
rules:
(A) General Declassification Schedule. (1) "Top Secret." Infor-
mation or material originally classified "Top Secret" shall become
automatically downgraded to "Secret" at the end of the second full
calendar year following the year in which it was originated, downgraded
to "Confidential" at the end of the fourth full calendar year following the
year in which it was originated, and declassified at the end of the tenth
full calendar year following the year in which it was originated.
(2) "Secret." Information and material originally classified "Sec-
ret" shall become automatically downgraded to "Confidential" at the
end of the second full calendar year following the year in which it was
originated, and declassified at ths end of the eighth full calendar year
following the year in which it was originated.
(3) "Confidential". Information and material originally classified
"Confidential" shall become automatically declassified at the end of the
sixth full calendar year following the year in which it was originated.
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applicable to all but excepted information010 a vast improvement
over the non-mandatory plan of 10501. The two most noteworthy
aspects of 11652 have been the Interagency Classification Re-
view Committee, designed to "monitor" the implementation of
the Order, 10 2 and the possible administrative sanctions imposed
upon those who unnecessarily classify or overclassify
information. 10 3
(E) Declassification of Classified Information or Material After
Thirty Years. All classified information or material which is thirty
years old or more, whether originating before or after the effective date
of this order, shall be declassified under the following conditions:
(1) All information and material classified after effective date of
this order shall, whether or not declassification has been requested,
become automatically declassified at the end of thirty full calendar
years after the date of the original classification except for such specifi-
cally identified information or material which the head of the originat-
ing Department personally determines in writing at that time to require
continued protection because such continued protection is essential to
the national security or disclosure would place a person in immediatejeopardy. In such case, the head of the Department shall also specify the
period of continued classification.
101. Id. § 5 (B) (1-4). Exempted from this scheme are:
(1) Classified information or material furnished by foreign govern-
ments or international organizations and held by the United States on
the understanding that it be kept in confidence.
(2) Classified information or material specifically covered by sta-
tute, or pertaining to crytography, or disclosing intelligence sources or
methods.
(3) Classified information or material disclosing a system, plan,
installation, project or specific foreign relations matter the continuing
protection of which is essential to the national security.
(4) Classified information or material the disclosurs of which
would place a person in immediate jeopardy.
102. Id. § 7.
(A) The National Security Council shall monitor the implementation of
this order. To assist the National Security Council, an Interagency
Classification Review Committee shall be established, composed of a
Chairman designated by the President, the Archivist of the United
States, and representatives of the Departments of State, Defense and
Justice, the Atomic Energy Commission, the Central Intelligence Agen-
cy and the National Security Council Staff. Representatives of other
Departments in the executive branch may be invited to meet with the
Committee on matters of particular interest to those Departments. This
Committee shall meet regularly and on a continuing basis shall review
and take action to ensure compliance with the order..
103. Id. § 13.
(A) Any officer or employee of the United States who unnecessarily
classifies or overclassifies information or material shall be notified that
his actions are in violation of the terms of this order or of a directive of
the President issued through the National Security Council. Repeated
abuse of the classification process shall be grounds for an administra-
tive reprimand. In any case whers the Departmental committee or the
Interagency Classification Review Committee finds that unnecessary
classification or overclassification has occurred, it shall make a report
to the head of the Department concerned in order that corrective steps
may be taken.
The most acclaimed cases under exemption (b)(1) of the 1967
Freedom of Information Act that involved documents classified
under Executive Order 10501 were Epstein v. Resor 114 and En-
vironmental Protection Agency v. Mink.10 5 In Epstein a histo-
rian at Stanford University's Hoover Institution on War, Revolu-
tion and Peace sought access to an Army file accumulated by the
Allied Forces Headquarters pertaining to "Operation Keelhaul."
Classified Top Secret pursuant to Executive Order 10501, the file
contained information on the forcible repatriation of 900,000
Soviet citizens following World War 11.106 The initial request
made to the Army was denied. Petitioner proceeded to the Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of California in accordance
with the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act. 0 7 The
Secretary of the Army's motion for summary judgment, pro-
pounded because of the classified status of the information, was
granted. 0 8 The court stated that it had no power to review the
merits of the classification but was limited merely to determin-
ing that the classification was not arbitrary and capricious.
Appealing to the Ninth Circuit, 0 9 petitioner asked that a de
novo review be made of the documents to determine if they were
in fact classified according to the apposite Executive standards.
The court, in affirming the District Court decision, said:
Unquestionably the Act is awkwardly drawn. However, in view of the
legislative purpose to make it easier for private citizens to secure
Government information, it seems most unlikely that it was intended to
foreclose . . . judicial review of the circumstances of exemption.
Rather it would seem (b) was intended to specify the bases for withhold-
ing. . . and that judicial review de novo with the burden of proof on the
agency should be had to whether the conditions of exemption in truth
exist.1 10 [emphasis added.]
It appears that the court was asserting the power to review the
justification for the government's refusal to furnish the re-
quested information.
In accord with the provisions of the Act"' the disclosure re-
quirements do not apply to those items enumerated in subsec-
104. 296 F. Supp. 214 (N.D. Cal. 1969), aff'd, 421 F. 2d 930 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 965 (1970).
105. Summary judgment for the gov't rev'd, 464 F. 2d 742 (D.C. Cir. 1972),
rev'd 410 U.S. 73 (1973).
106. 105 CONG. REC. A5615 (1959).
107. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (a)(3) (1966). For text, see III A. supra n. 73.
108. 296 F. Supp. 214 (N.D.Cal. 1969). See 83 HARV. L. REV. 928 (1970).
109. 421 F. 2d 930 (9th Cir. 1970).
110. Id. at 932.
111. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b) (1970). "This section does not apply to .... For full text
see III A supra n.77.
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tion (b), one of which concerns national defense and foreign
policy information. Thus, the scope of judicial review extends to
a determination of whether the agency's refusal to disclose was
in fact based on one of the items listed in subsection (b). The
language quoted above apparently does not mean that the court
would examine the factual circumstances underlying the clas-
sification itself to assay the validity or merit of the classification
under the Executive order standards. Rather, the court would
confine itself to determining whether the documents were clas-
sified and thus exempt from disclosure requirements. This con-
struction appears to be in accord with the court's view, for when
the petitioner asked for an in camera review of the merits of the
classification the court stated that
Section (b)(1) is couched in terms significantly different from the other
exemptions. Under the others (with the exception of the third) the very
basis for the agency determination - the underlying factual conten-
tion-is open to judicial review. Under (b)(1) this is not so. The function
of determining whether secrecy is required in the national interest is
expressly assigned to the executive. The judicial inquiry is limited to
the question of whether an appropriate executive order has been made
as to the material in question." 2 [emphasis added.]
However, in affirming the lower court's decision, the appellate
court noted that it possessed the power to determine if the
classification itself was arbitrary and capricious. This determi-
nation was to be made, inter alia, by reviewing the origin of the
file's classification and by other circumstances; 1 13 no in camera
review was to be permitted." 4
The Epstein decision has been criticized as having insufficient
112. 421 F. 2d 930, 933 (9th Cir. 1970).
113. Id. See 25 VAND. L. REV. 397 (1972) where it's stated by the commentator
at 400-401 that:
Furthermore, the court concluded that judicial review was limited to the
question whether an appropriate executive order invoking nondisclo-
sure under the foreign affairs and national security secrets exemption
had been promulgated on the material in question; judicial review of the
factual basis for the administrative determination to classify certain
documents as secret was precluded .... The Court . . . limited the
scope of judicial inquiry . . . to a determination whether the agency
decision to withhold ...was clearly arbitrary and capricious. This
inquiry. . . was limited by the court to an investigation of the origin of
the file contents and the surrounding circumstances, thus precluding
any in camera examination of the file. [emphasis added]
114. It should be noted that the circuit court did not forever exclude the
possibility of in camera inspections. It stated in dicta: "Further we agree that
judicial inquiry into this narrow area does not at least in this case, warrant in
camera examination of the file, 421 F. 2d at 933. [emphasis added]
support in the legislative history of the Act to justify making
distinctions regarding the depth of review according to the
character of the exemption relied upon.115 Nevertheless, a person
seeking information under the disclosure provision of the Free-
dom of Information Act who was refused that information could
file a claim in a district court. The court could proceed to exercise
de novo review to determine if the government was refusing
disclosure based on the premise that the requested documents
were in fact classified pursuant to Executive Order 10501. While
the court's scrutiny would extend to a determination as to
whether the classification was arbitrary and capricious, in cam-
era inspection would not be permissible. The determination
would be arrived at by considering the files classification and
other surrounding circumstances.
If Epstein left the court with some degree of control in examin-
ing the classification of documents by the executive, that control
was eliminated in the Mink case. This case arose from a dispute
regarding the advisability of a nuclear test explosion off Amchit-
ka Island, Alaska. The Environmental Protection Agency had
refused a request by Representative Patsy Mink that the recom-
mendations concerning the test be released to the public. Shortly
thereafter, she and 32 other Congressmen instituted a District
Court action in the District of Columbia under the disclosure
provisions of the Freedom of Information Act. The district court
granted summary judgment to the government on the basis that
the requested documents fell within the exemptions of subsec-
tions (b)(1) and (5) of the Freedom of Information Act. Of particu-
lar concern here is that portion of the opinion dealing with
exemption (b)(1) since several of the documents were classified
under Executive Order 10501. On appeal, the Circuit Court re-
versed"' the lower decision, noting that the scope of judicial
review of a claimed exemption clearly extended to determining
whether the refusal was based on a subsection (b) exemption" 8
and that an in camera inspection (to sift the unclassified docu-
ments from the classified ones to which they may be physically
connected) might be necessary." 9
115. See 42 U. CINN. L. REV. 529, 535 (1973); Developments in the Law-The
National Security Interest and Civil Liberties, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1130, 1221 at
1224 (1972).
116. The summary was based on both exemption 1 and exemption 5.
117. 464 F. 2d 742 (D.C.Cir. 1972). See 25 VAND. L. REV. 397 (1972).
118. This was the unequivocal holding of Epstein.
119. Mink v. E.P.A., 464 F.2d 742 (D.C. Cir. 1972) noted at 746 that if
[T]he nonsecret components are separate from the secret remainder
and may be read separately without distortion of meaning, they too
should be disclosed.
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In his majority opinion reversing the circuit court's decision
permitting in camera inspection, 2 ° Justice White clarified the
role of in camera inspection in the national defense and foreign
policy exemption cases. He stated that
The House Committee pointed out that Exemption (1) [(b)(1)] 'both
limits the present vague phrase "in the public interest," and gives the
area of necessary secrecy a more precise definition'. . . . Rather than
some vague standard, the test was to be simply whether the President
has determined by Executive Order that particular documents are to
be kept secret. The language of the act itself is sufficiently clear in this
respect, but the legislative history disposes of any possible argument
that Congress intended the Freedom of Information Act to subject
executive security classifications to judicial review. 121
Thus, the scrutiny of the court could only extend to determining
that the documents were classified under Executive order.
Beyond this there would be no examination of the propriety of
the classification itself.
What has been said makes wholly untenable any claim that the Act
intended to subject the soundness of executive security classifications
to judicial review .... It also negates the proposition that Exemption 1
authorizes or permits in camera inspection of a contested document
.... 122 [emphasis added.]
Justice Stewart concurred but addressed himself to the func-
tion of the court in examining agency subsection (b)(1) refusals.
He opined that "once a federal court has determined that the
Executive has imposed that requirement [(classification)] it may
go no further under the Act. '123 While Mink recognized the
correctness of Epstein in permitting de novo reviews of the
In remanding the case to the lower court the circuit court said:
Accordingly, in camera consideration 3f the documents by the Dis-
trict Court, looking toward their possible separation for purposes of
disclosure or nondisclosure is necessary .... [emphasis added]
120. 410 U.S. 73 (1973). This decision was derived from the majority's view
that Exec. Order No. 10,501 was incorporated into subsection (b)(1). This being so,
then even unclassified physically connected documents were also protected.
Exec. Order No. 10,501 states:
(b) Physically Connected Documents. The classification of a file or
group of physically connected documents shall be at least as high as that
of the most highly classified document therein ..
(c) Multiple Classifications. A document, product, or substance
shall bear a classification at least as high as that of its highest classified
component. The document ... shall bear only one overall classification
121. 410 U.S. 73, 82 (1973) See 42 U. CINN. L. REV. 529 (1973)
122. Id. at 84.
123. Id. at 94.
circumstances of exemption under subsection (b)(1) Mink de-
parted from Epstein in another respect. The Ninth Circuit in
Epstein had ruled that a court could go beyond a mere determi-
nation that the documents were in fact classified and determine
whether the classification was arbitrary and capricious. This,
however, had to be accomplished without an in camera examina-
tion. Mink prohibited this inquiry. 124 Even though the Mink
decision was unanimous, 125 the aversion of the federal courts
toward the disclosure of security information continued. In later
cases, the courts denied requests for classified information ini-
tially collected in World War II by the concerted actions of
several nations,1 26 for documents concerning the creation of the
National Security Agency in 1952,127 and for reports held by the
State Department concerning Prisoner of War camps in South
Vietnam. 28
Cases following Epstein, Mink and their progeny conspicu-
ously opposed court examinations of classified documents.
Courts were able to conduct de novo reviews only for the purpose
of determining whether the documents were classified in fact.
Under no circumstances would in camera examinations be per-
mitted, despite the fact there was no clear legislative history
supporting this position. Nothing in the Act itself or the Reports
indicated subsection (b)(1) should receive a different level of
review than any of the other subsection (b) exemptions.
124. See Comment, In Camera Inspections Under the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 557 (1973) where the commentator states at 566-67:
Mink rejects the suggestion made in earlier cases [Epstein] that a
judge faced with a claim under the national security exemption may
review the classification at least to the extent necessary to determine
that it is not arbitary or capricious. [emphasis added]
125. See the dissenting opinions of Justices Brennan and Douglas. Justice
Brennan contended that subsection (b)(1) only exempts documents "specifically
required by Executive Order to be kept secret" and that the language in Exec.
Order No. 10,501 permitting unclassified attached documents to receive the
classification of the file was not controlling. He concurred with the court of
appeals in calling for an in camera examination to glean the unclassified compo-
nents from the classified file. Justice Douglas agrees with these observations and
also notes that two days after certiorari was granted Exec. Order No. 10,501 was
amended by Exec. Order No. 11,652 which discontinued the classification by
association idea.
126. Wolfe v. Froehlke, 510 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1974). This case was a sequelto
Epstein.
127. Kruh v. General Services Administration, 64 F.R.D. 1 (E.D.N.Y. 1974).
128. Schaffer v. Kissinger, 505 F.2d 389 (D.C.Cir. 1974). The district court
granted the government's motion for summary judgment. On appeal the circuit
court vacated the judgment and remanded the case. The circuit court noted that
although Mink prescribed inquiries into the motives for executive classifications
of documents, the courts could nevertheless determine if the documents were in
fact classified in accordance with Exec. Order No. 11,652. The Schaffer decision
is thus consistent with Mink.
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Moreover, in light of the treatment that the judiciary had histori-
cally accorded government assertions of exemption, the courts -
appeared to be viewing executive claims of privilege with a
deference incompatible with the Court's position in United
States v. Reynolds. In that case the court stated that it was the
final arbiter of claims of privilege based upon national securi-
ty.129 While conceding that an in camera examination was not the
sine qua non to the Court's recognition of the validity of the claim
of privilege the Reynolds Court nevertheless acknowledged
that the depth of the evidentiary probe would be determined by
the need for the information 30 considered in light of various
other factors. 131 Mink stopped far short of Reynolds despite the
fact that both dealt with documents of a similar character. Jus-
tice White in Mink felt the mere fact of document classification
was sufficient to preclude further judicial inquiry. This seems to
be precisely the position the Reynolds Court disparaged, warn-
ing that executive assertions that information should be pro-
tected would not go uncontested. Yet Mink held that the bare
showing of executive classification forcloses further inquiry.
Although there are no definitive statements in the legislative
history of the Act to support the position that (b)(1) was meant to
be the analogical companion to the state secrets privilege in
nonlitigant 3 2 situations, this view has received support from the
commentators 3 3 and, in light of the 1974 amendments to the
129. See II B supra. n.50.
130. Id. n.53.
131. Id. n.52.
132. "Non-litigant" is used here to refer to one who is not a litigant at all or to
one who is suing the government in any suit other than one under the F.O.I.A. A
litigant could be defined as one who has a present, outstanding collateral suit
against the government and is merely using the F.O.I.A. as a discovery tool.
133. See Hoerster, The 1966 Freedom of Information Act -Early Judicial
Interpretations, 44 WASH. L. REV. 641 (1968-69). At 650-51 he states:
Two parts of the doctrine of constitutional executive privilege are
affected by the Freedom of Information Act: (1) executive privilege... ;
(2) the state secrets privilege. The first exemption from disclosure in the
Information Act provides that the Act shall not apply to matters "specif-
ically required by the Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of
the national defense or foreign policy."
By this exemption, Congress sought to carefully limit the encroach-
ment of constitutional executive privilege on the Information Act. By
preserving limited executive discretion over records dealing with na-
tional defense or foreign policy, Congress satisfied both parts of con-
stitutional executive privilege. [emphasis added]
Again at 654 the commentator notes:
In summary, it is clear that Congress took the doctrine of constitutional
Freedom of Information Act, has proved to be an accurate
appraisal.
IV
THE 1974 AMENDMENT TO THE NATIONAL DEFENSE AND
FOREIGN POLICY EXEMPTION
13 4
Cognizant of the fact that both Epstein and Mink had yielded
judicial constructions that were overly restrictive and at
executive privilege into account in drafting the Information Act. [em-
phasis added]
Thus Hoerster considers the state secrets privilege one of the two privileges
subsumed under the constitutional executive privilege, a view which differs from
the one taken in section II B of this article. But despite this classification
difference the thrust of the quotation persists. Hoerster believes the subsection
(b)(1) exemption is an application of the state secrets privilege to the Information
Act.
See also Davis, The Information Act: A Preliminary Analysis, 34 U. CHI. L.
REV. 761 (1967). He states at 785:
Whether the Act enlarges the executive power to withhold information
is unclear. Apart from the act, a court applying the law of the Reynolds
case may in some circumstances participate in the determination of the
scope of executive privilege (state secrets). . . . [T]he holding was, in
part, that "the court itself must determine whether the circumstances
are appropriate for the claim of privilege .... " Under the Act, the
Secretary [of Air Force or any other Executive Department officer]
would presumably ask the White House for an executive order, and a
presidential assistant would presumably comply. The court then might
be bound by the executive order, on the theory that the Act has delegated
power to the President. But the argument the other way has merit: The
first exemption, like all the other exemptions, merely means that the
Acts disclosure requirements do not apply, and when the Act has no
effect, the law is what it would have been without the enactment.
[emphasis added]
In other words, the courts should apply a Reynolds and not a Mink type test.
134. Following the enactment of the 1967 F.O.I.A. there were regular in-
quiries into the implementation of the Act. In November 1968, the House Govern-
ment Operations Committee issued a Committee Print listing and analyzing the
regulations promulgated by the various agencies to implement the Act. See
House Gov't Operations Comm., 90th Cong., 2d Sess., Freedom of Information
Act Compilation and Analysis of Dept'l Regulations Implementing 5 U.S.C. 552
(Comm. Print 1968).
In March and April of 1972 the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations and
Government Information, of the House Government Operations Committee,
began extensive public hearings on the administration of 5 U.S.C. § 552. See
Hearings, U.S. Gov't Information Policies & Practices-Administration and
Operation of the Freedom of Information Act, Foreign Operations and Gov't
Information Subcomm., House Gov't Operations Comm. 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. pts.
4,5 and 6 (1972). This ran for 14 days and heard over 50 witnesses.
H.R. REP. No. 1419, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) was a product of these hearings.
Subsequently several improvement bills were introduced by Subcommittee
Chairman Moorhead and Rep. Horton and Rep. Erlenborn. These bills were
denominated H.R. 5425 and H.R. 4690, respectively and hearings were held. The
Foreign Operations and Gov't Information Subcomm. adopted a number of
amendments to H.R. 5425. The resulting measure was H.R. 12471, the pertinent
sections of which will be quoted infra. n. 140.
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variance with the original intentions of Congress 3 5 in propound-
ing the Freedom of Information Act, the legislators endeavored
to clarify the existing language.136 '
Although Congress rejected a proposed amendment that
would have mandated in camera inspections in all cases, 137 it
nevertheless wished to select language that would evince its
dissatisfaction with some of the interpretations of subsection
(b)(1) the executive had previously attempted to thrust upon the
courts.'38 Particularly distraught by the Supreme Court's refusal
135. See S. REP. No. 854, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1974). Senator Kennedy in
speaking of the intent of the 1967 F.O.I.A., stated:
Congress did not intend the exemptions in the F.O.I.A. to be used either
to prohibit disclosure of information or to justify automatic withholding
of information. Rather, they are only permissive. They merely mark the
outer limits of information that may be withheld where the agency
makes a specific affirmative determination that the public interest and
the specific circumstances presented dictate-as well as that the intent
of the exemption relied on allows-that the information should be
withheld.
136. Id. at 7. The report notes:
The risk that newly drawn exemptions might increase rather than lessen
confusion in interpretation of the F.O.I.A., and the increasing accept-
ance by courts of interpretations of the exemptions favoring the public
disclosure originally intended by Congress, strongly militated against
substantive amendment to the language of the exemptions . . . .Al-
though by leaving it unchanged the committee is implying neither
acceptance of agency objections to the specific changes proposed .. ,
nor judicial decisions which unduly constrict the application of the Act.
137. S. REP. No. 854, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., 14 (1974). There it states: "One
proposal considered by the committee (S. 1142) would have required in camera
inspection of records in F.O.I.A. cases." Additionally the Report notes that John
Mills, a representative of the American Bar Association suggested that while in
camera techniques need not be used in all cases the courts should nevertheless be
enabled to reach a decision with respect to whether or not a particular record has
been lawfully withheld under the Freedom of Information Act in any manner
that it chooses," Id. at 14 [emphasis added]
138. See, Id. at 9. The Report notes that the Senate was rather alarmed at
some of the narrow interpretations the government had urged upon the courts.
Specifically, it notes the executive's suggestions in Epstein, stating "In one
remarkable instance, the government even contended that an 'agency determina-
tion that material sought falls within one of the nine exemptions in subsection (b)
precludes the broad judicial review provided by subsection (a)(3).' This conten-
tion was properly rejected." [emphasis added] Had the court in Epstein accepted
this interpretation, it could never have made a de novo review to determine if in
fact the information was actually classified. Agencies could have refused to
provide requested information on "classification" grounds of classification when
in fact the documents may not have been classified; the courts would then have
been powerless to make a determination whether the information was or was not
classified.
to permit in camera inspections under any circumstances, Con-
gress clearly hoped to uproot the Mink decision. 139 Although the
House and Senate proposals were initially conflicting, 140 a com-
promise was ultimately reached.'
The objectives. of the final amendment proposals were two-
fold. First, Congress wished to amend the subsection that called
for de novo reviews to assure that in camera inspections, al-
though discretionary, would be equally applicable to all subsec-
tion (b) cases. Second, the legislators hoped to revise the lan-
guage of the national defense and foreign policy exemption to
indicate that, if an in camera inspection was decided upon, that
139. See H. CONF. REP. No. 1380.93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1974), and S. CONF.
REP. No. 1200, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1974).
140. The Senate proposal to amend the 1967 Freedom of Information Act was
S. 2543. The section to amend judicial review, formerly 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3), was to
be denominated (4) (B)(ii). It read:
... In determining whether a document is in fact specifically required
by Executive order or statute to be kept secret in the interest of national
defense or foreign policy, a court may review the contested document in
camera if it is unable to resolve the matter on the basis of affidavits and
other information submitted by the parties. In conjunction with its in
camera examination, the court may consider further argument, or an ex
parte showing by the government, in explanation of the withholding. If
there has been filed in the record an affidavit by the head of the agency
certifying that he has personally examined the documents withheld and
has determined . . . that they should be withheld under the criteria
established by a statute or Executive order referred to in subsection
(b)(1) of this section, the court shall sustain such withholding unless,
following its in camera examination, it finds the withholding is without
a reasonable basis. . . . [emphasis added]
As for the national defense and foreign policy exsmption, it read:
(b) This section does not apply to matters that are-(1) specifically
required by an Executive order or statute to be kept secret in the
interest of national defense or foreign policy and are in fact covered
by such order or statute.
The House proposal, the history of which is traced in n. 134 supra, was H.R. 12471.
It read: (a)(3). . . In such cases the court shall determine the matter
de novo, and may examine the contents of any agency record to deter-
mine whether such record or any part thereof shall be withheld under
any of the exemptions set forth in subsection (b).
(b) This section does not apply to matters that are-) authorized
under criteria established by an Exscutive order to be kept secret
in the interest of national defense or foreign policy.
141. 88 Stat. 1561, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (Supp. 1974).
(a)(4)(B) On complaint, the district court of ths United States in the
district in which the complainant resides, or has his principal place of
business, or in which the agency records are situated, or in the District
of Columbia, has jurisdiction to enjoin the agency from withholding
agency records and to order the production of any agency record
improperly withheld from the complaintant. In such a case the court
shall determine the matter de novo, and may examine the contents of
such agency records in camera to determine whether such records or
any part thereof shall be withheld under any of the exemptions set
forth in subsection (b) of this section . . ..
(b) This section does not apply to matters that are--(1)(A) specifically
authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be
kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B)
are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order.
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inspection could extend to an examination of the propriety of the
classification measured against the relevant standards listed in
the standing Executive Order.
142
In respect to the first objective, Congress reaffirmed that, upon
an agency's refusal to provide the requested information, the
applicant could bring suit in a federal district court to enjoin the
withholding of the information. 1 43 In addition, the district court
was given the discretionary power to conduct an in camera
examination of the information the plaintiff sought.14 4 Since the
provision for in camera review was not mandatory it was not to
be used unless the court had first solicited and rejected govern-
ment affidavits and testimony regarding the exempt status of the
documents. 145 Congress was clearly seeking to restore to the
142. See. H.R. REP. No. 876, 93rd Cong., 2d. Sess. 1 (1974), where it is stated
that:
An amendment is made to section 552(b)(1) pertaining to natioa6nal
defense and foreign policy matters-in order to bring that exemption
within the scope of matters subject to in camera review as provided
under the amended language of section 552 (a)(3).
At 4-5 the Report notes:
Two amendments to the Act included in the bill are aimed at increasing
the authority of the courts to engage in a full review of agency action
with respect to information classified by the Department of Defense and
other agencies under Executive order authority.
The first of these in camera review amendments would insert an
additional clause in section 552 (a)(3) to make it clear that court review
may include examination of the contents of any agency records in
camera to determine if such records or any part thereof shall be with-
held under any of the exemptions set forth in section 552(b).
National defense and foreign policy exemption. The second amend-
ment. . . is a rewording of section 552 (b)(1) to provide that the exemp-
tion for information involving national defense or foreign policy will
pertain to records which are "authorized under the criteria established
by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense
or foreign policy." . . . The change [of] language . . . means that the
court, if it chooses to undertake review of a classification determination,
including examination of the records in camera, may look at the
reasonableness or propriety of the determination to classify the records
under the terms of the Executive order. ...
The In camera provision is permissive and not mandatory. It is the
intent of the committee that each court be free to employ whatever
means it finds necessary to discharge its responsibility. [emphasis
added]
143. 5 U.S.C. § 552 text at supra n. 141
144. Id.
145. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1380, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1974), where it is
stated that:
In determining de novo whether agency records have been properly
withheld the court may examine records in camera in making its deter-
mination under any of the nine categories of exemptions under 552 (b) of
the law. . . . While in camera examination need not be automatic, in
judiciary the powers and responsibilities it had assumed the 1967
Act had granted; a role the judiciary had traditionally played in
this area, the one confirmed by the Supeme Court in Reynolds.
Prior to the restrictive construction of the Act in Mink the
judiciary had never permitted the executive to arrogate the
authority to determine that information could properly be with-
held by claiming that dislcosure would threaten national security
interests. In Reynolds the Court was explicit in its suggestion
that it was the final arbiter in determining whether requested
information deserved protection in light of national defense or
foreign policy considerations. The 1974 amendment to subsec-
tion (a)(3) assured that the Courts could conduct in camera
reviews of information claimed to be exempt under any of the
subsection (b) exemptions.
Subsection (b)(1) itself was also amended to read:
(b) This section does not apply to matters that are - (1) (A)
Specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive
order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign
policy and (B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to such
Executive order.
The most conspicuous addition to the 1967 Act was the phrase
which stated that the materials for which an exempt status was
claimed must be "in fact properly classified pursuant to such
Executive order." This phrase, coupled with the amendments to
Subsection (a)(3) (which made it clear that the provision allowing
in camera examinations applied to all subsection (b) exemptions)
and with the legislative history of the Amendment 146 emphasizes
that Congresses' manifest intent was to permit judges to inquire
into the merits of exemptions claimed by the government. The
many situations it will plainly be necessary and appropriate. Before the
court orders in camera inspection, the Government should be given the
opportunity to establish by means of testimony or detailed affidavits
that the documents are clearly exempt from disclosure. [emphasis
added]
See also S. CONF. REP. No. 1200,93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1974). The contents of this
report did not disturb the House Conferees in this respect. The report states:
However the conferees recognize that the Executive departments re-
sponsible for national defense and foreign policy matters have unique
insights into what adverse affects might occur as a result of public
disclosure of a particular classified record. Accordingly the conferees
expect that Federal courts, in making de novo determinations under
section 552 (b) (1) cases ... ,will accord substantial weight to an agency's
affidavit concerning the details of the classified status of the disputed
record.
Again at Page 3 the report notes:
Before court orders in camera inspection, the Government should be
given an opportunity to establish by means of testimony or detailed
affidavits that the documents are clearly exempt from disclosure. [em-
phasis added]
146. H.R. REP. No. 876 supra n.142.
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courts would no longer be forced to limit their inquires to
whether a matter was in fact classified but could also scrutinize
the factual content to determine if the information was classifia-
ble in light of Executive order standards. These amendments
were intended to make it clear that Epstein and Mink were no
longer talismanic. The courts could now move beyond making
mere determinations of classification with Congressional ap-
proval.147 Reynolds had been resurrected.
In Reynolds, as noted earlier, the Court asserted its authority
to determine the validity of the asserted privilege. The determi-
nation process, however, was designed so as not to force the
disclosure of information the privilege was designed to protect.
The usefulness of the state secrets privilege would be nugatory if
in every case the court required an in camera disclosure of the
information for the court's appraisal. Therefore, the Reynolds
court held that it would make its determination by considering
the surrounding circumstances and the fact that a compelled
disclosure might result in a reasonable danger that sensitive
information would be released. While not requiring in camera
review under the facts at hand the Court did note that the depth
of judicial probes into the evidence would be determined by the
need for the evidence. Conceiveably, the need could be compel-
ling enough to necessitate an in camera examination, particular-
ly if the possibility of disclosing truly sensitive information was
not acute.
147. One of the principal reasons many persons opposed in camera examina-
tion under the 1967 Act was their apprehension over the fact that this procedure
could result in the disclosure of vital national secrets to those who might not
guard them. Not all commentators shared this view. See Developments in the
Law-The National Security Interest and Civil Liberties, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1130,
1221 at 1223 (1972), where the commentator states:
The desire to avoid in camera examination of secret papers rests on an
unexplained assumption. . . that disclosure to a judge may somehow
jeopardize national security. But there is no reason why a federal judge
cannot be trusted to keep the Governments legitimate secrets, especially
inlight of the widespread disclosure of classified material to Congress-
men without any serious security problems.
See Dep't. of Defense Directive No. 5400.4, Provision of Information to Congress,
sec. III. A.I. (Feb. 20, 1971), and Department of State, Uniform State/AID/USIA
Security Regulations (1969) in BASIC DOCUMENTS 38. These are the regulations
providing for disclosure to Congressmen.
Surely Congress was aware that it was anomalous to provide for revelation of
secrets to Congressmen and not federal judges. This inconsistsncy undoubtedly
was considered in the process of amending to the 1967 Act.
The 1974 amendments appear to be in accord with the
Reynolds test. Under the present law the in camera device is
available but its use is discretionary. The Act clearly states that
the court "may" examine the information in camera and the
legislative history makes it clear that in camera is permissive and
not mandatory. Generally, before it will order an in camera
examination and in an effort to decrease the risk of disclosing
sensitive information the court will request testimony and af-
fidavits from the government in order to evaluate the merits of
the asserted classification. The courts are under no greater Con-
gressional constraint today to use in camera scrutiny than they
were under the Reynolds standard. Both the new amendment
and Reynolds permit an in camera examination if the court
considers the conditions efficacious. Both focus on accurately
assaying the necessity for protection without requiring complete
disclosure. In Reynolds the Court seriously considered the af-
fidavits and testimony of the Secretary of the Air Force concern-
ing the need for protection. The 1974 amendments call for no
more. Affidavits and testimony will be relied upon as a means of
measuring the validity of the asserted need to protect ths infor-
mation without using an in camera examination to arrive at the
proper conclusion. However, if the government's evidence
proves unconvincing and the court is satisfied that it can conduct
an in camera examination under aseptic conditions, then it is
free to order an in camera disclosure of the information.
In the only reported case concerning the national defense and
foreign policy exemption following the recent amendment-
Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. v. Colby 48 the court indicated that the
diffidence of the pre-amendment years continues. Here the
plaintiffs were a former State Department Intelligence Officer
and a former member of the Central Intelligence Agency. They
had collaborated on a book which allegedly contained informa-
tion held in classified government files. The information was
discovered when, in accord with the contractual arrangement,
the publication was submitted to the agencies' for editing. The
plaintiffs contested the agencies claims that the classified infor-
mation could not be disclosed in a district court action filed
under the 1967 Freedom of Information Act.
The district court held that, since Mink prohibited inquiry into
the propriety of the classification itself and because refusing to
permit the plaintiffs to communicate information within their
own knowledge encroached upon First Amendment freedoms,
148. 509 F.2d 1362 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 95 S.Ct. 1555, 95 S.Ct. 1999.
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the court could require a strict burden of proof as to the fact of
classification. 149 On appeal to the Fourth Circuit, Judge Hayns-
worth noted that the Freedom of Information Act had been
amended so as to provide for an inquiry into the propriety of the
classification. 50 However, in vacating and remanding the deci-
sion he also noted that the burden of proof required by the
district court relating to the fact of classification was too strin-
gent. In support of this he stated that there is a "presumption of
regularity in the performance by a public official of his public
duty,"'15 and that this presumption coupled with a showing that
the files in question were officially and properly stamped, would
generally be enough to satisfy the question of classification.
Commenting upon the newly restored "right" to conduct in
camera examinations, Judge Haynsworth admonished the dis-
trict court that:
It is not to slight judges, lawyers or anyone else to suggest that any such
disclosure carries with it serious risk that highly sensitive information
may be compromised. In our own chambers, we are ill equipped to
provide any kind of security highly sensitive information should have.
The national interest requires that the government withhold or delete
unrelated items of sensitive information. . . .It is enough. . . that the
particular item of information is classifiable and is shown to have been
embodied in a classified document. This approach is consistent with
the Freedom of Information Act which. . . provides the judges only
with discretionary authority . . .he may find the information both
classified and classifiable on the basis of testimony or affidavits. 152
[emphasis added.]
Thus, despite the fact Congress has reaffirmed the authority of
the courts to settle disputes over the need for protecting certain
information, it appears unlikely that the courts will move with
much alacrity to exercise this power. 5 3 They will be discriminat-
ing in its exercise, attempting to guarantee that the right to force
149. 509 F.2d 1362 (4th Cir. 1975). At page 1366 Haynsworth discussed the
burden of proof as follows: information was not classified "until a classifying
officer makes a conscious determination that the governmental interest in
secrecy outweighs a general policy of disclosure and applies a label of 'Top
Secret' or 'Secret' or 'Confidential' to the information in question." [emphasis
added] Needless to say the government failed to meet this burden.
150. Id at 1367.
151. Id. at 1368.
152. Id. at 1369.
153. It should be noted, however, that Judge Haynsworth admitted to having
examined some of the information the government claimed was sensitive. See p.
1368.
disclosure, even to the court itself, will not result in the revelation
of the very materials the privilege is designed to protect.
CONCLUSION
The Federal Housekeeping Statute and Section 3 of the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act of 1946 provided statutory authority
for withholding requested information on the ground that it
contained sensitive national defense or foreign policy materials.
The former statute was amended to prevent its being used by the
government as a general "non-disclosure" law and the 1946 Act
was replaced by the Freedom of Information Act of 1967. While
legislative action rendered the "housekeeping" statute ineffectu-
al as authority for non-disclosure, the Supreme Court's construc-
tion of the national defense and foreign policy exemption of the
Information Act provided new justifications for continued gov-
ernmental non-disclosure. Although the propriety of classifica-
tions was held to be beyond judicial inquiry, this interpretation
of the Act found no support in the Act itself or in its legislative
history and was at odds with the views of commentators 54 and
with specific judicial decisions. 155
In an effort to recast a judiciary in the active role it played
under the state secrets privilege, Congress amended the Infor-
mation Act in 1974 to provide that the courts could, at their
discretion, conduct in camera reviews to inquire into the factual
need for the classification of information. However, as in the past
and as the legislative history and the only reported case to date
indicates, the courts will proceed with due circumspection. In
efforts to reduce the likelihood that an in camera examination
might result in the disclosure of truly privileged information, the
courts will initially attempt to make their determination on the
basis of affidavits and testimony submitted by the government.
Only if these procedures prove inadequate will the courts order
in camera disclosures.
Rex J. Zedalis
154. See Davis, The Information Act: A Preliminary Analysis, 34 U. CHI. L.
REV. 761 (1967).
155. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
